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I. INTRODUCTION
Children are entitled to counsel, including a lawyer free of charge in a
delinquency case, because the Supreme Court so held thirty-five years ago in
In re Gault.' The Florida trial courts seem to have trouble properly explain-
ing to a child about the right to counsel and determining whether the waiver
is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This year, the intermediate appellate
courts ruled in a number of cases on relatively blatant violations of the juve-
nile's right to counsel. The Supreme Court of Florida weighed-in in the area,
albeit on a procedural matter. The court held that, while a motion to with-
draw a plea is generally required prior to appellate review, since the child
had no lawyer, a direct appeal would lie.2 Issues of the right to counsel also
arose in dependency and termination of parental rights cases where, by stat-
ute, Florida requires counsel for parents. The intermediate appellate courts
ruled that a parent is entitled to proper notice of a proceeding, as well as no-
tice to the attorney for the parent, that failure to appear may result in termina-
tion of parental rights.' However, the court is bound by the context of the
statute, which addresses when there must be parental appearance and when
counsel may withdraw at the appellate level.4 The proper standard for with-
drawal differs, and is dependent upon which district court of appeal is speak-
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; J.D., Boston College, 1970; B.A., Colgate University, 1967. The author
thanks Scott Turner and Diane Howard for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 387 U.S. 1(1967).
2. State v. B.P., 810 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. 2002).
3. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2002).
4. Id.
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ing.5 Finally, in both the dependency and termination area, a number of ap-
pellate court opinions deal with the question of prospective neglect, includ-
ing how to evaluate whether the neglect of one child can constitute grounds
for neglect of the other, under the 1991 United States Supreme Court opinion
in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services.6
1I. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
The 1967 United States Supreme Court ruling in In re Gault requires
the provision of counsel to children in delinquency cases, and if the child is
indigent an attorney paid for by the state.7 As reported in virtually every
juvenile survey article written by the author since 1989, the Florida trial
courts continue to fail to comply with Gault's provision of counsel require-
ment.' In V.S.J. v. State,9 the failure of the court to properly advise a child of
the right to counsel and waiver was again before the appellate court. ° As
has happened so often in Florida, the trial judge addressed the juveniles ap-
pearing before it en masse and advised the youngsters as a group of their
rights.'" Reversing and remanding for the failure to comply with proper ad-
vice of the right to counsel and failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent
waiver of counsel at every stage of the proceedings, the appellate court in
V.S.J. said, "[w]e recognize that this method [referring to the en masse ex-
planation] offers some convenience, but it also reduces the probability that
every accused will be adequately and effectively advised of his or her consti-
tutional rights."' 2 The trial courts ought to dispose of this regular violation
of children's constitutional rights and provide the proper admonition and
evaluation of voluntary relinquishment on an individual basis.
5. Id.
6. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
7. 387 U.S. at 41.
8. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2001 Survey of Florida Law, 26 NOVA L. REV. 903,
903-04 (2002) [hereinafter Dale 1]. Under Florida law, children do not have the right to coun-
sel in dependency or termination of parental rights cases. See also Michael J. Dale, Providing
Counsel to Children in Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769, 783
(2001).
9. 793 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
10. Id. at 105.
11. Id. (citing G.E.F. v. State, 782 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)); see also
Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REV. 91, 94 (2000)
(discussing this precise issue) [hereinafter Dale 11].
12. Id. at 105-06.
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In M.Q. v. State,13 the Fifth District Court of Appeal also reversed for
failure to properly offer counsel and failure to adequately inquire as to the
waiver of counsel.' 4 The appellate court decision could not be any more di-
rect. "One proceeding even involved an en masse group advisement of rights
by the trial [court]. For this reason we write again on the duties and respon-
sibilities of trial judges with regard to offering legal representation in juve-
nile proceedings."'' 5 The court, thereafter, cited to the entire rule of juvenile
procedure governing the duties and responsibilities of the trial court to notify
children about their right to counsel.' 6 The court went on to cite other exam-
ples of failure to comply with the rules, including the following colloquy in
the opinion:
JUDGE: Would it be your desire that you need to have
an attorney, or would you like to represent yourself on
that one?
M.Q.: I'll represent myself.
JUDGE: Would you like to enter a plea of guilty or not
guilty?
M.Q.: Guilty.' 7
The court ruled that this inquiry was insufficient and then, using italics,
said the following: "The requirement is one of detailed inquiry, because it is
'extremely doubtful that any child of limited experience can possibly com-
prehend the importance of counsel."" 8
The admonition about right to counsel under the Florida Rules of Juve-
nile Procedure is also multifaceted, requiring the court to tell the child a
number of things and then inquire as to whether the child knowingly and
intelligently enters the plea and waiver of counsel based upon the under-
standing of a variety of admonitions. In J.MB. v. State,'9 the court failed to
inform the child of the possible dispositions available to the court and failed
13. 818 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 616-17; see V.S.J., 793 So. 2d at 104 (rejecting this process).
16. MQ., 818 So. 2d at 617 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165).
17. Id. at 618.
18. Id. (citing State v. T.G., 800 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2001); P.L.S. v. State, 745 So. 2d 555,
557 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting G.L.D. v. State, 442 So. 2d 401, 404 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1983))).
19. 800 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
2003]
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to advise the child that he was entitled to be represented by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings.2 ' The appellate court found that the inquiry was
incomplete, and thus, there was no effective waiver of counsel in accordance
with section 8.165 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which is fun-
damental error requiring reversal.2'
Not only is the court's inquiry multifaceted, it must also be thorough.
In T. Mv. State,22 the court compared and contrasted the inquiry at the adjudi-
catory stage before one judge and the inquiry at the dispositional stage before
a second judge, and then recited the full section of the relevant Florida Rule
of Juvenile Procedure in the text before concluding that the judge did not
conduct a thorough inquiry.23 The inquiry made by the trial judge, essen-
tially, was whether the child understood that he had a right to counsel, that a
public defender would be appointed to represent the child if he so desired,
and the child's age.24 The appeals court found this was reversible error.25
While the trial courts repeatedly fail to properly advise children of their
right to counsel, the question of how procedurally to challenge such failure
ultimately came before the Supreme Court of Florida recently in State v.
T.G.26 The question in T.G. was whether a juvenile was required to preserve
the error, in the context of failure to advise of the right to counsel, with a
motion to withdraw a plea prior to seeking appellate review of the plea. 7 On
the adult side, in Robinson v. State28 the court held that the adult statute lim-
ited a defendant's right of appeal from a guilty plea to matters occurring con-
temporaneously with the plea.29 Thus, defendants were required to attack the
validity of the guilty plea in the trial court before challenging the plea on
direct appeal.3" The court in T. G. held that Robinson applies to juvenile de-
linquency proceedings, reading the amended juvenile statute so that juveniles
pleading guilty or nolo contendere may directly appeal an involuntary plea




20. Id. at 318 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.080(b)(1), (2)).
21. Id. (citing M.A.F. v. State, 742 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
22. 811 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
23. Id. at 839.
24. Id. at 838-39 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165).
25. Id. at 839.
26. 800 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2001).
27. Id. at 206.
28. 373 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1979).
29. Id. at 900.
30. Id.
31. 800 So. 2d at 206.
[Vol. 28: 1:1
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However, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that there is an exception
in the situation where the juvenile enters into a guilty plea without the benefit
of counsel, and the juvenile has not knowingly and intelligently waived the
right to counsel.32 While Robinson applies to a juvenile who is represented
by counsel and claims that his or her plea is involuntary due to an inadequate
plea colloquy requiring the juvenile to file a motion to withdraw the plea, the
same is not true where the juvenile entered the plea without the benefit of
counsel and did not knowingly or intelligently waive the right to counsel.33
This is fundamental error, according to the court in T.G., because of the
"unique concern for juveniles who enter pleas without the benefit of coun-
sel. 34 Thus, the court established what it described as a "narrowly drawn
and extremely limited exception to Robinson" for juveniles who enter un-
counseled pleas where the trial court fails to comply with the requirements of
the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. 35 Because there was a failure to make a
thorough inquiry into the child's comprehension of the offer and the capacity
to make a knowing and intelligent choice, and because there was not even
any offer made at the dispositional stage, the Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed and remanded.36
Florida's speedy trial rule in juvenile delinquency matters requires that
the State commence trial within ninety days. 37 Application of the speedy
trial rule, in a variety of contexts, has been repeatedly before the state appel-
late courts.38 In R.F. v. State,39 the question was whether the speedy trial
time had run, measured from the time the child was taken into custody, one
of the two tests for the running of the time period.4" The State took the posi-
tion that the child was not taken into custody when he was issued an "ar-
rest/notice to appear" document at the police station.4 ' However, the appel-
late court disagreed. 42 Relying upon section 985.03(55) of the Florida Stat-
32. Id. at 212; see also State v. B.P., 810 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2002) (following TG. v. State
in context of waiver of counsel at plea hearing where child was shown a video that explained
the right to counsel and a public defender was consulted but never appointed).
33. T.G., 800 So. 2d at 212.
34. Id. at 213.
35. Id. (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.165).
36. Id. at 213.
37. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a).
38. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REV. 819, 834-35
(1999) [hereinafter Dale Ill]; Dale ll,supra note lI, at 96.
39. 798 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
40. Id.; see FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.090(a)(1).
41. R.F., 798 So. 2d at 17-18.
42. Id. at 20.
2003]
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utes,43 the court determined that the documents in evidence showed that the
child was arrested when he received the notice." The child went to the po-
lice station in response to the police officer's request that he appear there to
be arrested or processed, was issued a notice to appear, and was in fact for-
mally processed and charged.45 Thereafter, he was released to his mother.46
The court concluded that the speedy trial rule applied because the evidence
showed that the official took the child into custody and elected to release the
child to the mother.47
In 1985 the United States Supreme Court decided New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 48 in which the Court established the test for the legality of school
searches. A large body of both state and federal opinions have followed
from the T.L.O. opinion. 49 In T.L.O., the Court held that the Fourth Amend-
ment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in the
school setting, but the balance between a child's right of privacy and the
government's need for effective control of the school setting required a lesser
standard, which the Court articulated as "reasonable" suspicion." One ex-
ample of the limitation on a child's privacy involves the school locker.5 In
Florida, by statute, the principal of a public school, or other school official
designated by the principal, has authority to search the student's locker if that
individual has reasonable suspicion of prohibited or illegal substance in that
locker.5 2 In ME.J. v. State,53 the court held that when a student was found in
a school parking lot smelling of marijuana twenty minutes after school had
begun and the student acknowledged smoking marijuana, it was reasonable
for school officials to check the locker where a knife, rather than marijuana,
was found. 54 The child's adjudication as delinquent for possession of a
weapon on school property was thus affirmed.55
43. Id. at 19. "'Taking into custody' means the status of a child immediately when tem-
porary physical control over the child is attained by a person authorized by law, pending the
child's release, detention, placement, or other disposition as authorized by law." FLA. STAT.
§ 985.03(55) (1999).
44. R.F., 798 So. 2d at 20.
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id. at 20.
48. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
49. See 2 MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 10.07[l ],at 10-46
(2003).
50. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
51. FLA. STAT. § 232.256 (2001).
52. § 232.256(2).
53. 805 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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Illegal secure detention, in violation of the risk assessment instrument
under Florida law, also occurs where the child is detained based upon non-
attendance at school, as previously ordered by the court. 6 In R.G. v. State,
no risk assessment was made out. 7 The statute is clear that such a require-
ment is obligatory. 8 Had the trial court sought to detain the child based
upon indirect criminal contempt, an order to show cause, a hearing within
twenty-four hours, and notice would have been necessary. 9 None occurred,
and the appellate court reversed.6°
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, is the following statement from
the appellate court in R.G.:
this is the sixth emergency habeas corpus petition filed against this
same judge since March 26, 2002. In each case, the Attorney
General's Office has conceded error. We would think that the
message to this trial court judge should be clear that he, too, must
follow the law. We trust that after this opinion, the trial court
judge will modify his conduct accordingly. 6'
B. Dispositional Issues
Florida provides that a child also may be confined in secure detention
following commitment and pending placement.62 The question before the
Second District Court of Appeal in J. W. v. Leitner63 was whether a child
must "meet [the] statutory 'detention criteria' to qualify for placement in
secure detention" when the commitment is to a high-risk residential pro-
gram.64 The court held that the risk assessment evaluation scheme in the
Florida statute, applying to detention criteria, is no different for children
awaiting placement in a high-risk residential facility than it is for children
awaiting placement in other facilities. 65 Furthermore, the court rejected the
State's argument that it could rely upon representations of the Department of
56. R.G. v. State, 817 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2002). See generally
FLA. STAT. § 985.213 (2002).
57. R.G., 817 So. 2d at 1020.
58. § 985.213(2)(a).
59. R.G., 817 So. 2d at 1020.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See generally § 985.215(10).
63. 801 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
64. Id. at 296.
65. Id. at 297.
2003]
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Juvenile Justice that the child's lifestyle supported detention, in order to meet
detention requirements.66
In a case of first impression, the First District Court of Appeal, in L.S. v.
State,67 agreed with other jurisdictions that have "upheld the constitutionality
of similar DNA data base statutes. 68 In L.S., a juvenile pled nolo contendere
to a burglary charge, in exchange for an agreement by the State to drop a
different charge. 69 Thereafter, the State requested that the child be compelled
to give a blood sample or DNA testing as provided for by Florida law.70 The
district court of appeal rejected all of the child's constitutional arguments,
finding the statute constitutional as against the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth
Amendment claims as well as a Florida Constitutional right of privacy chal-
lenge."'
Among the dispositional alternatives, restitution is available in Florida
in delinquency cases.7" Under Florida law, jurisdiction ends when the child
turns nineteen.73 In Cesaire v. State, the question was whether the court
could consider an order to show cause for contempt after the child turned
nineteen and when the child failed to make restitution.74 The court held that
the juvenile court did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the restitution order
beyond the child's nineteenth birthday, although the state statute provides for
such authority.75 Thus, the court had no jurisdiction to enter a new order
requiring the payment of restitution.76 Moreover, a subsequent order to show
cause for failure to appear and subsequent contempt was likewise void be-
cause the underlining restitutional order was void for lack ofjurisdiction.77
Until recently, Florida used the term "community control" to mean pro-
bation.78 That term has now been changed, as of 1998, to probation.79 Under
certain circumstances, a child who is on probation status and who is alleged
to have violated that status by committing another delinquent act may be
66. Id.
67. 805 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
68. Id. at 1007.
69. Id. at 1005.
70. Id. at 1006; see FLA. STAT. § 943.325(I) (2002).
71. L.S.,805So. 2dat 1008.
72. See generally G.J.V. v. State, 637 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cesaire
v. State, 811 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
73. FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2002).
74. Cesaire, 811 So. 2d at 817.
75. Id. at 818; see also § 985.201(4)(c).
76. Cesaire, 811 So. 2d at 818.
77. Id.
78. Dale 11, supra note 11, at 96.
79. See § 985.215(2)(a); Dale 11, supra note I1, at 96.
[Vol. 28: 1: 1
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held in secure detention.8" The question before the court in D.H. v. Esteves,
was how to define probation when the statute refers specifically to "proba-
tion program."'" The court held that the term probation was more extensive
and did not just involve "program[s]," thus, ruling that secure detention was
appropriate.82
Florida's juvenile delinquency dispositional statute allows a court to or-
der placement at a restrictiveness level that differs from the Department of
Juvenile Justice's recommendation.83 However, when the court disagrees
with the recommendation it must state so on the record and its rationale must
be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.84 In K.N.M v. State,85 a
significant factor in the trial court's decision not to accept the recommenda-
tion of the Department of Juvenile Justice was the court's belief in the juve-
nile's lack of remorse and unwillingness to admit guilt.86 On appeal, the
court reconfirmed the proposition that it is improper for a trial court to ag-
gravate a sentence when a defendant fails to exhibit remorse.87 The appellate
court held that in a dispositional hearing, the juvenile has a constitutional
right to avoid aggravation of a sentence on those grounds.88
Three decades ago, in two cases, Morrissey v. Brewer89 and Gagnon v.
Scarpelli,9 ° the United States Supreme Court applied due process protections
to parole revocation in the adult context, finding that a parolee had a liberty
interest in his parole. In those cases the court set up due process procedures
including: 1) written notice; 2) disclosure of evidence; 3) an opportunity to
be heard in person and present witnesses; 4) the ability to confront and cross-
examine witnesses; 5) a hearing before a neutral and detached hearing offi-
cer; and 6) a written statement of the decision.9 While the Court in the sec-
ond case, Gagnon, did not provide that there was an absolute right to coun-
sel, it said that the issue should be decided on a case-by-case basis.9 2 In MT.
80. D.H. v. Esteves, 790 So. 2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001). See generally
§ 985.215(2)(a).
81. Id.
82. D.H., 790 So. 2d at 1276.
83. § 985.23(3)(e).
84. See A.C.N. v. State, 727 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
85. 793 So. 2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
86. Id. at 1196.
87. Id. at 1198.
88. Id. (citing A.S. v. State, 667 So. 2d 994, 996 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); R.A.B. v.
State, 399 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
89. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
90. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
91. Id. at 782; Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 489.
92. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790.
2003]
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v. State,93 the trial court had revoked a child's parole after a hearing, finding
that an affidavit of violation was unnecessary since the child was on a sus-
pended commitment and that the effect of the revocation would be to remove
him from community control to commitment, which had been previously
imposed on the child, but suspended.94 The appellate court held, relying
upon Gagnon, that due process protections apply to a proceeding alleging a
violation of community control for juveniles.95 The court held further that
the child did not receive proper notice of the violation that served as the basis
of the revocation, and thus, it reversed.96
Florida, like other states, provides for parole revocation hearings, until
recently, referred to as community control violation hearings.97 In J.S v.
State,98 the appellate court found that the trial court violated the child's due
process rights by failing to give the juvenile adequate time to prepare for a
violation hearing. 99 The facts are worth reciting. When the case was called,
the community control officer advised the court that she was ready to pro-
ceed, and at that point the court appointed an assistant public defender to
represent the child."° The lawyer received a notice of violation of court or-
der ten minutes before, said she was not prepared to proceed, objected to the
proceeding that day, and asked for a hearing.'' The lawyer explained that
she had not had an opportunity to speak with her client, nor to investigate.'
0 2
The court offered her five minutes more and the attorney objected.0 3 The
proceeding went forward and community control was revoked."° The appel-
late court reversed, describing the court's violation of the constitutional
rights in polite terms as "palpable abuse of [judicial] discretion."' 5
The question of whether Florida's Sexual Predators Act0 6 applies to ju-
veniles has been before the court on several occasions, most recently in
T.R.B. v. State.10 7 In that case, a child pleaded nolo contendere to the charge
of sexual battery on a child under twelve, was adjudicated as delinquent and
93. 805 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
94. Id. at 899.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Dale 1I, supra note 11, at 96.
98. 796 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1256-57.
102. Id. at 1257.
103. J.S., 796 So. 2d at 1257.
104. Id.
105. id.
106. FLA. STAT. § 775.21 (2002).
107. 796 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
[Vol. 28: 1: 1
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/2
2002 SUR VEY OF FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW
was then declared a sexual predator, pursuant to the adult statute.108 The
appellate court reversed, holding that adjudication of delinquency is not a
conviction for purposes of the sexual predator statute, and that there was no
legislative intent to give the juvenile court authority to declare the child a
sexual predator.'0 9 The ruling conflicts with a Second District Court of Ap-
peal decision in Payne v. State."'
C. Appellate Issues
Two courts have recently been faced with the question of how to proce-
durally handle appeals challenging sentences beyond the statutory maximum,
where the proper appellate procedure was not followed. Section 985.234(1)
of the Florida Statutes requires all juvenile appeals to proceed pursuant to
the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appellate rules provide that
an appeal may not be taken unless prejudicial evidence is preserved."' In
J.C.R. v. State 1 2 and A.M ex rel D.M v. State,"3 the Fourth and Fifth Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal, respectively, held that when a juvenile is sentenced
beyond the statutory maximum for a particular crime, a fundamental error
occurs that may be corrected without regard to preservation of issues."4
III. DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
In 1997 the Florida Legislature amended chapter 39 to provide that in-
digent parents must be appointed counsel in dependency proceedings.' "' In
In re MC., 6 a mother appealed from an order denying a motion to reopen a
dependency case concerning her child.' '7 The Department of Children and
Family Services (appellee) failed to afford due process to the mother by
properly notifying her and her attorney of a motion to terminate the depend-
ency proceeding because the child had been in the custody of a matemal aunt
for an extended period of time." 8 The court order relieved the Department of
108. Id. at 641.
109. Id. (citing J.M. v. State, 783 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
110. 753 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000), rev. denied, 773 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2000);
Dale I, supra note 8, at 909-10.
111. See FLA. STAT. § 90.104 (2002).
112. 785 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
113. 790 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
114. Seeid. at 1235; J.C.R., 785 So. 2dat 551.
115. See Dale 111, supra note 38, at 828.
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any further supervision of the child and placed the child in the care and cus-
tody of the maternal aunt." 9 The mother wrote the court, seeking to have the
child and siblings returned to her. 20 Apparently, without her knowledge, the
Department ordered to terminate the mother's supervision.' 2 ' Subsequently,
the court appointed a new lawyer to represent the mother, and counsel filed a
motion to reopen the dependency case. 122 The Department filed a new mo-
tion to terminate supervision, despite the longstanding existence of a case
plan aimed at reunification. 123 The court, inexplicably, terminated supervi-
sion based upon the length of time that the child had been in the care of the
maternal aunt.' 24 The appellate court reversed, finding a violation of due
process in that the earlier case plan goal was reunification and that there had
been no finding that reunification would be detrimental to the child's well-
being.
2 5
Mental abuse, as defined in chapter 39 governing dependency proceed-
ings, has not been the topic of significant appellate review. That changed,
however, with the recent opinion in G. C. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies. 26 Abuse is defined as "any willful act or threatened act that results in
any physical, mental, or sexual injury or harm that causes or is likely to
cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly
impaired."' 27 The question in G.C. was how to evaluate the test for willful
mental abuse. 28 The case arose from a sexual abuse claim against a father
toward two daughters. 29 The trial court found that after the alleged sexual
abuse occurred, the mother, in an attempt to gain the return of the father to
the family unit, allowed a private investigator to interview the children, and
thus, the children were subjected to willful mental abuse.'30 The appellate
court reversed, holding that the mother may have used poor judgment in tell-
ing the children the truth about the consequences of their actions and that she
was following the advice of the lawyer when she allowed the investigator
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. MC., 796 So. 2d at 568.
122. Id. at 567.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 568.
125. Id.
126. 791 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
127. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (2002).
128. G.C., 791 So. 2d at 20.
129. Id. at 18.
130. Id. at 19.
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into the home to talk to them, but that neither was sufficient to establish men-
tal abuse as defined by the law.'
The Florida courts are often asked to determine whether a child is sub-
ject to prospective neglect or abuse. Under the Florida Statutes, such pro-
spective abuse or neglect is tested by evaluating whether the child is sub-
jected to "substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect by the
parent or parents or legal custodian."'' In a dependency proceeding, the
state must prove the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence.'33 Flor-
ida appellate courts have held that the trial court is not obligated to wait until
the child is abused and neglected before adjudicating the child dependent.'34
In C. W. v. Department of Children & Families,3 ' the father had a twenty-
two year alcohol problem and there had been domestic violence between the
parents, thus, placing the children at risk. 36 The appellate court explained
that the father had stopped drinking and began attending Alcoholics Anony-
mous two months before the petition was filed and nearly a year before the
hearing.'37 Moreover, the mother had obtained an injunction against the fa-
ther for domestic violence four months before the dependency petition was
filed, and there had been no subsequent acts of domestic violence.' 38 There
was no evidence that the father would repeat the cycle of alcohol abuse and
domestic violence, and the children appeared to be well adjusted. 3 9 And
finally, because there was no competent substantial evidence of prospective
abuse or neglect in the record, the court reversed. 4 0
The Florida Statutes do not define how imminent the prospective ne-
glect must be. It is clear, however, that there need not be actual prior abuse,
abandonment, or neglect before the court finds dependency, just so long as
the imminent risk requirement is met.' 4' In E.M.A. v. Department of Chil-
dren & Families, 42 the court relied on an earlier ruling that where a nexus is
shown between a parent's mental disorder and a significant risk of danger to
131. ld. at 21.
132. § 39.01(14)(f).
133. Richmond v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 658 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
134. See Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 547 So. 2d 981, 983-84 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
135. 789 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 497-98.
139. Id. at 498.
140. C.W., 789 So. 2d at 499.
141. See Denson v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 661 So. 2d 934, 935 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Richmond, 658 So. 2d at 177.
142. 795 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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the child, the court need not wait for the abuse or neglect to occur.'43 In the
case at bar, there was a clear nexus between the father's mental disorder and
the inevitable prospect of another manic episode that would place the chil-
dren in danger. 44 The court added that the legislature, in writing the relevant
provision of chapter 39, did not require the injury to occur before a finding of
neglect or abuse, where the exact timing of the next manic episode could not
be predicted, but that it would happen very soon. 145 The same issue arose in
B.D. v. Department of Children & Families,46 where the court gave inconsis-
tent verbal and written findings on the issue of whether the parent's mental
illness was clearly connected to child-rearing capacity. 147 Relying on its rul-
ing in E.MA., the First District reversed and remanded for further findings,
clearly stating whether the Department met its burden to satisfy one of the
dependency grounds.
48
The issue of whether alleged abuse of one child constituted grounds for
dependency of another child was before the court in K.C. v. Department of
Children & Families.'49 A father appealed from a dependency adjudication
as to one child, based upon alleged physical abuse by the father of the girl-
friend's other child. 5' The trial court relied upon its memory of the testi-
mony in the prior proceeding, where the father was not a party, and where
testimony was not admitted into evidence in the instant proceeding to find
dependency. 5' The appellate court held, first, that there was no establish-
ment of a nexus between the father's alleged abuse of the first child and the
potential abuse of the second child;'52 citing the Supreme Court of Florida
2000 opinion of In re MF., '53 where the court reversed based upon the fact
that the trial court solely based its determination of dependency of one child
upon the dependency adjudication of the other. More significantly, the court
held that there was no competent evidence before the court in K.C.,5 4 be-
cause the trial court relied upon its memory of prior testimony, where the
143. Id. at187.
144. Id. at 186.
145. Id. at 188.
146. 797 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
147. Id. at 1265 (citing E.M.A. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 795 So. 2d 183, 186 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Richmond v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 658 So. 2d
176, 177-78 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
148. Id. at 1265.
149. 800 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 200 1).
150. Id. at 677.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000); Dale I, supra note 8, at 913-14.
154. K.C., 800 So. 2d at 677.
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father had no opportunity to challenge the testimony or cross-examine wit-
nesses. 155
After a dependency adjudication under Florida law the Department of
Children and Family Services shall develop a case plan for each child who is
to receive services.'56 The case plan is to include a permanency goal for the
child including the type of placement. 57 In F.M. v. Department of Children
& Families,'58 a mother appealed from an order of dependency and disposi-
tion approving a case plan that had a permanency goal of maintaining and
strengthening the placement with the child's father who had taken custody of
the child.' 59 The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling finding that
reunification under the Florida statute is not the only possible role of a case
plan. 60
Once a child is declared dependent and in foster care, the child is in the
legal care of the Department of Children and Family Services. The question
in Department of Children & Family Services v. G.M 6 was whether a court
order was necessary to allow a child to have surgery, specifically removal of
a cyst under the chin.'62 Chapter 39 provides that DCF may give the child
ordinary medical care and may consent to medical treatment.'6 3 But neither
term makes reference to surgery and the terms are not defined. However,
section 743 of the Florida Statutes does deal with persons who may consent
to medical care of a minor that does not include surgery."6 Thus, the appel-
late court held that routine medical examination may be authorized but a
surgery, inherently invasive by nature, is not ordinary and thus a court order
is necessary.'65
The issue of how informal dependency matters may be was before the
Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department of Children & Families v.
H. W. W. 166 In that case the judge called an informal meeting in chambers to
explore options for obtaining financial assistance for the children in a de-
155. Id. at 678 (citing Petersen v. Dep't of Children & Families, 732 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 740 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1999)).
156. § 39.601.
157. § 39.601(3)(a).
158. 807 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 201-02 (citing § 39.601(5)).
161. 816 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
162. Id. at 831.
163. See § 39.407(1), (13).
164. See FLA. STAT. § 743.0645(l)(b) (2002).
165. G.M, 816 So. 2d at 832.
166. 816 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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pendency proceeding. 67 The parents of the children, although parties, were
not informed of the meeting, which resulted in an order finding that the chil-
drens's grandparent would be a "relative caregiver" under Florida law enti-
tled to receive financial assistance. 68 The appellate court reversed, stating:
We are unaware of how prevalent is this practice of a judge con-
vening "meetings" rather than conducting hearings in juvenile
cases. Such a practice does appear to be fraught with potential for
problems, however. Certainly, if one of these "meetings" appears
to be moving in the direction of court action, it is incumbent on the
court to either adjourn the meeting and convene a hearing in ac-
cordance with the rules, or to create a record establishing that
those procedures have been waived. 1
69
Two cases decided this year affirmed the principle that speedy trial
rules do not apply to dependency cases as they do in delinquency cases. In
M.T. v. Department of Children & Family Services170 and J. W. v. Department
of Children & Families,7' the courts held that there is no equivalent to Rule
8.090 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which governs speedy
trials in delinquency cases. There are time frames referenced in chapter 39,
but they are viewed by the courts as only directory and not mandatory or
jurisdictional.'72
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
As described previously in this review, Florida law provides nine dis-
tinct grounds for termination of parental rights. 173 Included among them is
the situation where a parent fails to comply with a case plan for a period of
twelve months, which constitutes evidence of continuing abuse, neglect, or
abandonment. 174 This section of the statute applies only when a parent is
provided with a case plan with the goal of reunification but not when the
goal is termination. It was this problem that arose in In re Z.JS. "' The De-
partment did not offer the parent a case plan with the goal of reunification.'76
167. Id. at 1250.
168. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.5085 (2000)).
169. Id. at 1251.
170. 816 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
171. 812 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
172. MT., 816 So. 2d at 229.
173. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1) (2002).
174. § 39.806(1)(e).
175. 787 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
176. Id. at 878.
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In that situation the Department must establish another ground for termina-
tion of parental rights. Thus, the court reversed.'
An interesting second issue in In re Z.J.S. dealt with the father's effort
to have his child placed with relatives as an alternative remedy. 178 The ap-
peals court recognized that on remand the trial court should revisit the issue
of whether the child could be placed within relatives' care. 79 Significant is
the concurrence of Judge Northcutt recognizing that parents have fundamen-
tal rights to care, custody, and management of their child, which he argued
requires the court to grant deference to the father's plan. 8°  In Judge
Northcutt's view, the constitution requires respect for a parent's private
placement decision "just as it does for the myriad other choices a parent must
make in the raising of a child."''
Failure to comply with a case plan was also before the appellate court in
In re G.R. 182 The Department of Children and Families alleged in its petition
to terminate that the mother was in material breach and did not remain drug
free. 183 The appeals court relied upon the Supreme Court of Florida decision
in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services84 to rule that
while the state has a paramount interest in protecting children from harm, the
parents have a fundamental right to the care of their children which may only
be compromised using the least restrictive means to protect the children from
serious harm. 185 Here the court found that the state acted prematurely be-
cause the mother was making rehabilitative efforts and there was no evidence
of severe neglect of the children. 86 Thus, as the court stated "there is no
compelling need to rush to judgment under these facts."' 187
A separate ground for termination of parental rights in Florida involves
one incident where the parent engaging in egregious conduct or failing to
177. Id. at 879.
178. Id. at 877.
179. Id. at 879.
180. Z.J.S., 787 So. 2d at 879 (Northcutt, J., concurring) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982)).
Many parents who are unable to tend their children elect to place them with relatives or friends
to ensure that the children receive proper care. Surely, such decisions are within the ambit of
fundamental parenting rights, and the state has no authority to interfere with them in the ab-
sence of the exceptional circumstances specified in Chapter 39, Florida Statutes.
Id.
181. Id. at 880.
182. 793 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
183. Id. at 989.
184. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
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prevent egregious conduct which threatens the life or safety of the child. 88
A single act may be enough to terminate parental rights. However, that sin-
gle act must be of significant intensity, magnitude, or severity as to endanger
the life of the child. 89 The Second District Court of Appeal in In re D. W.90
evaluated whether in a particular factual situation one act was enough. The
court recognized that termination of parental rights must be the least restric-
tive methodology for protecting the child from serious harm.' 9' However,
under the facts of the case the Department did not demonstrate that termina-
tion was the only option to protect the child. 92 Under the facts of the case,
the mother had never been given a chance to demonstrate that she could
safely maintain a relationship with the child.'93 Thus, the court reversed. 94
As noted earlier in the section of this survey discussing dependency
proceedings, prospective neglect based upon parental abuse of one child then
can be used as evidence of a basis for termination of the parental rights to
another child.'95 That issue arose in A.C. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies,'96 where the question was, inter alia, whether the mother's act of inflict-
ing bums on a daughter should constitute grounds to terminate the parental
rights over a son. 9' The court found that there was no evidence submitted by
the Department that the single act of abuse of the prior child created a sub-
stantial risk of injury to this child and that the termination of parental rights
was in the child's best interest as the case law in Florida provides.'98 Under
Florida law a single act of abuse does not itself constitute proof of imminent
risk of abuse and neglect of that child or of another unless the behavior is
beyond the parent's control and is likely to continue and place the child at
risk. Furthermore, the termination must be the least restrictive means to pro-
tect the child.' 99
To some degree in both prospective neglect adjudications and in termi-
nation of parental rights cases, the court does have to make some prediction
about future behavior of the parent. When a prediction becomes speculation,
188. § 39.806(l)(f).
189. § 39.806(l)(f)(2).
190. 793 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
191. Id. at 40 (citing Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 41.
195. Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
196. 798 So. 2d. 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
197. Id. at 33.
198. Id. at 36.
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the adjudication cannot stand. In re C. W. W.2 00 was a termination of parental
rights case involving a two-month old child of a mother with significant sub-
stance abuse problems. 20 ' The Department never offered the mother a case
plan with the goal of reunification but rather commenced the termination
proceeding inter alia on the grounds of future harm to the child irrespective
of the provision of services.0 2 The appellate court held that the Department
did not establish that the continuing involvement of the mother with the child
would threaten the child's life, safety, or health irrespective of services being
provided.203 The court explained that the Department could cite no case in
which parental rights were terminated solely on the basis of the birth of a
drug-dependent child.2' The court's conclusion that the mother would fail in
any attempt to comply with a case plan with a goal of reunification was
speculation, and not a valid basis for terminating parental rights.205 And fi-
nally, the court added that the Department had failed to establish that termi-
nation was the least restrictive means of preventing harm to the child, an
additional standard required under Florida law.20 6 The court therefore re-
manded.20 7
Abuse and neglect resulting in termination of parental rights can also be
proven based upon past conduct with regard to other children. In C. W. v.
Department of Children & Families,2 °8 the appellate court reviewed the facts
and concluded that termination of parental rights to siblings because of abuse
and neglect may serve as grounds for terminating parental rights, citing
Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services."9 Significantly,
there was a dissent demonstrating the difficulty with application of
Padgett.211 Judge Ervin, dissenting, argued that there must be a causal con-
nection between the past conduct and the present.2
A problematic interpretation of prospective neglect based upon parental
abuse of one child used as the basis for termination of parental rights to a
200. 788 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
201. Id. at 1022.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1023.
204. Id. at 1024.
205. C.W.W., 788 So. 2d at 1023.
206. Id. at 1025.
207. Id.
208. 814 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
209. Id. at 492; Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571
(Fla. 1991).
210. C.W., 814 So. 2d at495 (Ervin, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 496.
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second child is A.B. v. Department of Children & Families.2 2 In that case,
the court seemed to opine that, based upon Padgett,2 3 a parent whose paren-
tal rights have been terminated as to one child may avoid termination as to
another child "if he or she comes forward with evidence that the circum-
stances or pattern of conduct that led to termination of parental rights to the
other child cannot serve as a predictor of his or her conduct with the child at
issue. 2 14 This rationale seems to suggest that the parent must demonstrate
that his or her conduct changed after the State proved the termination as to
the other child. It does not appear that this is what Padgett held.
Another and equally important issue was before the court in A. C. v. De-
partment of Children & Families,215 involving the question of the effect of a
parent's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in the termination of parental rights case because of an ongoing
criminal proceeding.1 6 In both A.C. and in an earlier opinion in C.J. v. De-
partment of Children & Families217 the courts held that the trial court is obli-
gated to exercise discretion when balancing the interests of the child in per-
manent placement at the earliest possible time with affording fairness to the
parents. The criminal case can take a substantial period of time and thus,
while a termination of parental rights proceeding may be continued, that con-
tinuance must be balanced against the circumstances of the child.2t 8
Problems a child encounters after being removed from the home relat-
ing to separation from the parents do not constitute grounds for termination
of parental rights. Two courts have so held. In In re F.MH.B.,219 the fact
that a child was having great difficulty adjusting to foster care and school
after separation from the parents was not a basis for termination of parental
rights.220 Similarly, in 1999 the court held in In re K.C.C.22 1 that a young-
ster's need for counseling because of anxiety as a result of separation from
the parents did not support termination of parental rights.222
Included among the grounds for termination of parental rights in Florida
is voluntary relinquishment of parental rights.223 However, even in the con-
212. 816 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
213. 577 So. 2d at 565.
214. A.B., 816 So. 2d at 686.
215. 798 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
216. Id. at 35.
217. 756 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct App. 2000).
218. A.C., 798 So. 2d at 35.
219. 803 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
220. Id. at 839.
221. 750 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
222. Id. at 41.
223. See § 39.806(1)(a); § 39.808(4).
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text of voluntary relinquishment certain procedural due process rights apply.
In L.O. v. Florida Department of Children & Family Services,224 a mother
appealed from an order terminating her parental rights based upon a prior
plea agreement in a criminal case in which she entered a guilty plea to ne-
glect and violation of probation and also consented to termination of parental
rights.225 When the Department of Children and Family Services subse-
quently filed a termination of parental rights petition and the mother moved
to withdraw her consent, the court entered an order terminating parental
rights nunc pro tunc.226 The appellate court reversed, holding that chapter 39
provides no short cuts in termination proceedings based on voluntary surren-
der of parental rights.227 An adjudicatory hearing on a petition for voluntary
termination must be held within twenty-one days after filing the petition.228
The parent was not given an opportunity to deny any of the allegations of the
petition nor to introduce testimony.229 The court thus reversed.230
A second case interpreting voluntary relinquishment of parental rights is
T.C.B. v. Florida Department of Children & Families. 23' In that case, when
the Department sought to terminate parental rights, the mother, through
counsel, made an offer of settlement or compromise providing that in return
for the cancellation of the termination proceeding the mother would carry out
her obligations under a case plan and if she defaulted, the Department would
be entitled to receive executed surrenders for the children.232 After that hap-
pened, the mother appealed a final order terminating her parental rights, chal-
lenging the settlement agreement.233 The First District Court of Appeal re-
versed, finding that the contract was in fact void as against public policy and
that it violated legislative intent.2 34 Further, the appellate court held that in
any circumstances an adjudicatory hearing must be held where the Depart-
ment would establish the elements required for terminating parental rights by
clear and convincing evidence.235
224. 807 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
225. Id. at 811.
226. Id. at 812.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 813.
229. L.O., 807 So. 2d at 813.
230. Id.
231. 816 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
232. Id. at 196.
233. Id. at 195.
234. Id. at 196-97 (citing Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d
565, 570 (Fla. 1991); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982); § 39.806(l)(a)).
235. Id. at 197.
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In addition to defining separate grounds for termination of parental
rights, Florida law provides that the court must also determine that termina-
tion of parental rights is in the manifest best interest of the child.236 Florida
law contains eleven factors the court shall consider in making this determina-
tion.237 In K.M. v. Department of Children & Families3 there was no evi-
dence that the court considered the factors regarding the best interests of the
child 9.2 " The appeals court reiterated what is clear under Florida law-that
termination shall be based upon clear and convincing evidence after review
of all statutory factors.24 °
In what one would have thought was an issue that never would have
reached the appellate court, the Fifth District Court of Appeal in E.J. v. De-
partment of Children & Families24 ' held that a successor judge may not make
a judgment based upon a reading of the court file and the transcript of a hear-
ing held before his predecessor in the absence of a stipulation by the par-
242ties.
As a practical matter which ought not require elucidation, a judgment
terminating parental rights must be based upon evidence in the record. In In
re J.MM 243 the court made findings reciting the court-appointed guardian ad
litem's beliefs about the best interest of the child being served by termination
of parental rights, that the child had formed a significant relationship with a
parental substitute, and "that no bond or love existed between the parent and
the child."2" Unfortunately, there was no evidence as to the first two; as to
the third, the evidence was to the contrary.245 Thus, where the judgment was
not based on record evidence, the court reversed.
46
Under Florida law, failure to appear at an advisory hearing in a termina-
tion of parental rights case can result in a default and termination of parental
rights.247 In In re W C.,248 a parent had his attorney appear at the advisory
hearing in a termination of parental rights case regarding two children of a
father who resided in New Jersey. The court terminated parental rights based
236. § 39.810.
237. Id.
238. 795 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
239. ld. at 1130.
240. Id.
241. 795 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
242. Id.
243. 795 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
244. Id. at 1036.
245. Id.
246. Id. (citing In re C.W.W., 788 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
247. See § 39.801(3)(d).
248. 797 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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upon the failure of the father to appear.249  The Florida Legislature had
changed the statute regarding personal appearances in amendments to the
law in 1998 which precluded appearances through counsel at the advisory
hearing as the method of appearance. 5 ° The appellate court in W.C. found
that the clear intent of the legislature was that the parent personally appear
because it provides the court with an opportunity to demonstrate that it per-
forms a statutory duty of informing the parent of rights and responsibilities in
the termination case.2 ' The appellate court thus affirmed.252
On the other hand, termination of parental rights based on default can
only occur in situations set forth in the Florida statute,253 which provides for
failure to appear in either an advisory or adjudicatory hearing. In
In re C.R.,254 the court held that neither a docket sounding nor scheduling
conference at which the parent failed to appear allowed for default because
the statute did not speak to either of these two settings. 5 The court relied
upon other earlier opinions to the effect that termination of parental rights
may not be entered on default unless specifically authorized by statute.256
Appointed counsel on occasion will seek to withdraw from representa-
tion on appeal in termination of parental rights cases where the lawyer con-
cludes that the appeal is frivolous. 257 The Supreme Court of Florida has
never established a procedure for withdrawal of counsel in termination cases.
However, in Pullen v. State, the court did establish a procedure for with-
drawal of counsel in involuntary civil commitment cases under the Baker
Act.258 In so doing, the court relied upon Anders v. California,259 in which
the United States Supreme Court established the grounds for withdrawal of
counsel in criminal proceedings. The lower appellate courts in Florida have
used the Anders test for some time in termination cases. In N.S.H. v. De-
partment of Children & Family Services,26 ° the Fifth District Court of Appeal
affirmed an earlier Fifth District opinion in Ostrum v. Department of Health
249. Id. at 1276.
250. Id. at 1275.
251. Id. at 1276.
252. Id.
253. See § 39.801(3)(d).
254. 806 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing In re B.A., 745 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999); In re A.L., 711
So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
257. Pullen v. State, 802 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Fla. 2001).
258. Id. at 1117.
259. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
260. 803 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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& Rehabilitative Services26' in which the Fourth District established an An-
ders-like procedure for withdrawal that differs from the approach employed
in Pullen. Under Ostrum the lawyer serves a motion to withdraw on the cli-
ent with certification in the motion to the court that counsel in good faith has
discovered no valid error below, and there is an opportunity for the client to
file a brief individually or through counsel. 62 Anders as employed in Pullen
actually requires the filing of a brief indicating that there is no merit to the
appeal. 263 The Florida courts are thus split on the particular procedure, and
the issue will be decided by the Supreme Court of Florida.2"
The issue of the application of stays on appeal in termination of parental
rights cases was before the Second District Court of Appeal in In re
MA.D.265 In that case the Department filed a petition to terminate parental
rights and after an adjudicatory hearing the court denied the petition, order-
ing that the children be sent to New York for a visit with their mother pend-
ing approval of the placement using the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children.266 The Department appealed the denial of the petition to termi-
nate.267 Then after the notice of appeal was filed, the mother filed a motion
seeking immediate placement of the children with her.268 The Department
objected on the grounds that the notice of appeal constituted an automatic
stay precluding changing placement during the appeal.269 The trial court
agreed and the mother filed an emergency motion for relief of the stay in the
appellate court.27° The appeals court engaged in a process of statutory con-
struction looking at the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Florida
Statutes, and the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure.T' The court con-
cluded that the provisions read together provide for an automatic stay in the
termination case when the court terminates parental rights and directs that the
child be placed for subsequent adoption.2 72 The rationale for the stay avoids
the significantly disadvantageous consequences of allowing the child to be
261. 663 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
262. N.S.H., 803 So. 2d at 879.
263. Id.
264. Martinez v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 785 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2001), rev. granted, 819 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 2002).
265. 812 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).





271. Id., see FLA. R. APP. P. 9.146(c); FLA. STAT. § 39.815(3) (2002); FLA. R. Juv. P.
8.275(a).
272. In re M.A.D., 812 So. 2d 509, 512 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
[Vol. 28: 1:1I
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 2
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/2
2002 SURVEY OF FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW
adopted only to have the termination reversed on appeal.273 The court ex-
plained that the stay did not apply to the situation where the Department had
not proven a legal basis to terminate to parental rights, and that obligating
children to remain in foster care pending resolution of the appeal would not
serve the purposes of chapter 39.274 Holding children in foster care after the
court ordered return of the children would only "prolong the state-imposed
absence of stability in the lives of these children." '275 The court did say that
while an automatic stay did not exist under the law, the Department was free
to seek a stay in the individual case based upon the circumstances of that
case.
276
In a case that may be of first impression, the First District Court of Ap-
peal recently was faced with questions of whether parents are constitution-
ally entitled to competent court-appointed counsel in a dependency proceed-
ing, and if so, what means should be used to ensure that the right is not de-
nied. The issues were raised in L. W. v. Department of Children & Family
Services. 77 The closest the court had previously come to these questions was
in the context of a dependency proceeding implicating possible permanent
termination of parental rights. In In re MR.278 the court had held that there
was the implication that counsel provide competent assistance. The court
also noted that the position in MR. was consistent with a large number of
other jurisdictions.2 79 The court looked at several cases which had indeed
dealt with effective assistance in dependency proceedings and concluded that
the right to counsel was something more than a meaningless formality.28
While immediate termination of parental rights might not be in the offing,
the court recognized that it is a possibility that the parent could lose custody
of the child or be separated from the child for a significant period of time.
The court also determined that the standard to be applied for compe-
tence of counsel is that used in a criminal case.2 1' The court noted that the
vast majority of courts have applied that standard, which had been enunci-
ated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington.282 In
that case, the Court held that the performance must be deficient by falling
outside the broad range of professionally-acceptable activity and that the




277. 812 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
278. 565 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
279. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 554.
280. Id. at 555.
281. Id. at 556.
282. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
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deficient performance must prejudice the defense, meaning that there must
be a reasonable probability that without the unprofessional errors there might
be a different result." 3 The court in L. W. concluded that the Strickland stan-
dard is well-established and straightforward and therefore it concluded that it
ought to be applied.2"4 The procedure to be used to raise the effective assis-
tance of counsel is habeas corpus because that is the only available rem-
edy.28 5 Laches, finally, is available where there has been an unreasonable
delay in raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
286
Whether a fifteen-year-old minor who is the respondent in a termination
of parental rights case with respect to her own minor child has the right to the
appointment of a guardian ad litem and an attorney was before the Fourth
District in MC. v. Department of Children & Family Services.287 The court
answered the question in the negative, finding that there is no statutory enti-
tlement to both. 28 The court reviewed the relevant rules of juvenile proce-
dure and could find nothing in the rules nor in the statutes making special
provision for respondent parents who also happen to be minors.2 9 The court
discussed the distinction between the role of the guardian ad litem and the
lawyer finding that they were not coextensive. 20 Finally, the court found
that the term "child" referred to in both statute and court rule was not meant
to include parents who were also minors.29'
The failure of a mother's attorney, who was appointed for her because
she is indigent, to appear at a termination of parental rights hearing does not
allow the court to conduct a hearing in the absence of counsel without first
inquiring as to whether the mother wished to proceed without counsel and
whether the mother knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel.
In In re L.N.,292 the appellate court reversed for this reason stating what ought
to be obvious--"that the procedure followed by the trial court failed to sat-
isfy due process requirements that meaningful assistance of counsel be pro-
vided to the Mother.,
293
283. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
284. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 556.
285. Id. at 557.
286. Id.
287. 814 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).




292. 814 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
293. ld. at 1144.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Florida appellate courts have spoken vigorously and bluntly about
the failure of the trial courts to properly advise children of their right to
counsel in delinquency cases as has been reported for over a decade in sur-
vey articles in this Journal. The appellate courts also spoke to specific issues
about the right to counsel and notification in dependency and termination of
parental rights cases. Finally, the courts worked this past year to flesh out
the rules for prospective neglect, first established by the Supreme Court of
Florida in 1991 in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Ser-
Vices.294
294. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
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